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Although state authority in the field of labor relations has been
continually restricted by judicial interpretation and legislative pro-
nouncement, certain areas of state jurisdiction still remain. The material
presented herein represents a selection of those cases which appear to
be the most noteworthy and significant. Emphasis is placed on factual
patterns, procedural problems and judicial holdings, rather than an
analytical comparison of the cases, except where obvious contradictions
appeared. Where practical, the general form and outline developed in
the two previous articles on this subject have been followed.'
Of continuing interest in the field of Florida labor law are the
questions dealing with enforcement of the Florida right-to-work law,
the place of Florida courts in the enforcement and interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements, and the exercise by state courts of
jurisdiction over certain activities of unions, their officers and members.
The following basic outline has been used to present the development
in these areas:
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* The instant survey article covers volumes 155 through 177 of the Southern Reporter,
Second Series.
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I. LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. National Labor Relations Act, Section 14(b) and Enforcement
of Florida Right-to-Work Law
Although the main activity during the survey period centered on the
federal level (and in the halls of Congress concerning the possible repeal
of section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act) 2 the Florida
courts continued to try to develop a workable formula, within the per-
mitted realm of the second Schermerhorn decision.'
Two cases of particular note were decided by the courts during the
past two-year period. Interestingly enough, both cases evolved from
the same factual situation.
In the first, Kitchens v. Doe,4 the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed a decision of a circuit court, and held that a union's attempt to
induce an employer to execute a union security agreement was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
court held that the state court lacked jurisdiction of an employee's action
against union officials for violation of state right-to-work law, since
no union security agreement had been executed or negotiated. The plain-
tiffs in the case were employees of Scherer & Sons, Inc., a manufacturer
of belts, buttons and accessories in the garment industry in Miami.
The defendants were officials of Local 415 of the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union. The salient paragraphs of the complaint
charged the union with picketing the employees for the purposes of
coercing them to join the union, in violation of the employee's rights
under the Declaration of Rights to the Constitution of the State of
Florida.5 Basically, the complaint alleged that the activity of the labor
union was directed towards establishing a union security agreement
whereby the union would represent the employee-plaintiffs, although they
alleged that they had no desire to join the union.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, a temporary injunction
was granted prohibiting the union from picketing. Both parties moved
for summary judgment and the trial court granted the defendant union's
motion, and dissolved the temporary injunction. The plaintiffs appealed.
In reaching its decision, the district court of appeal stated that the
1. Mintz, Labor Law, 16 U. M.J.& L. REv. 275 (1961); Mintz, Labor Law, 18 U.
MIrxT L. REv. 734 (1964).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1965).
3. Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963). State power, recognized
by § 14(b), begins only with actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement
described by § 14(b). For complete discussion of both Schermerhorn cases and earlier judi-
cial application, see Mintz, Labor Law, 18 U. MIAms L. REV. 734-737 (1964).
4. 172 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
5. FLA. CONST., DEcL. OF RIGHTS, § 12, popularly known as the Florida "right-to-work"
provision, as implemented by FLA. STAT. ch. 447 (1963).
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circuit court had correctly applied the law as set forth in the second
Schermerkorn case. 6 The circuit court had indicated that in the second
Schermerhorn case, the United States Supreme Court had affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court's ruling7 that the state court had authority only
where the agreement had already been executed or negotiated.
Only four days before the decision by the Third Circuit in the
Kitchens case, the Florida Circuit Court, Dade County, in Scherer &
Sons, Inc. v. ILGWU, Local 415,1 held that the Federal Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act does not deprive a Florida circuit court of jurisdiction
of an action by an employer to restrain a union from picketing in viola-
tion of the Florida right-to-work law,9 even though there is no union
security agreement between the picketed employer and the union. In
the Scherer case, the court found that there was, already in existence,
an agreement between the union and an employer association which pro-
vided that, if the union was successful in its objective, the employees of
an employer, picketed by the union, would be precluded from choosing
whether or not to join a union. The agreement involved was between
the union and the apparel manufacturers association in the Miami area,
who constituted a source of work done by Scherer. The agreement pro-
vided that employees of employer-members of the association might do
work on goods only if the goods conformed to the requirements of the
agreement between the association and the union to the effect that such
goods, ". . . shall be made only by workers covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements with the union."
Although the Scherer case grew out of the same factual situation as
Kitchens v. Doe,'° the court held, on rehearing after the Kitchens case,
that the paramount issue in the Scherer case, when compared with the
Kitchens case, was the existence of a contract, between the union and
other manufacturers in the area, which constituted both primary and
secondary economic pressures on the plaintiff to compel him to execute
a contract with the defendant union, and to require his employees to
join the union even though none of the plaintiff's employees were or
evidenced a desire to become members of the union." The court found
that such agreements expressly affect the employees of Scherer and,
in effect, require that unless they belong to a union, no work would be
received by the shop. The court commented:
Thus, it is seen that in the present case there is such an agree-
ment referred to in the Nellie Kitchens case which distinguishes
6. Supra note 3.
7. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 141 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1962).
8. Case No. 61-1417, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Mar. 12, 1965, reported in 59 L.R.R.M.
2331.
9. Supra note 5.
10. Supra note 8.
11. Id. at 2333.
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it and supports state action under the "right-to-work" law,
consistent with the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in the
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn ....
Since both cases are now on appeal, ultimately either the Supreme
Court of Florida or the Supreme Court of the United States will be
called upon to clarify the Schermerhorn decisions as to the type or types
of agreements referred to and the metes and bounds of Justice Douglas'
language, "state power . . . begins only with actual negotiations and
execution of the type of agreement described by Section 14(b).
1 2
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 18
A. Breach of Contracts of Employment
1. ELECTION OF REMEDIES
An employee, in the event of discharge, may ordinarily elect to sue
for wrongful discharge without pursuing remedies available to him under
an employment contract which provides a grievance procedure. However,
if he challenges the validity of his discharge by evoking the procedures
for hearing and determination under an existing employment contract,
he thereby "elects his remedy" and cannot thereafter maintain an action
at law for damages arising out of the wrongful discharge. 4
Determining whether an employee must exhaust his "administrative
remedies" before bringing a common law action, the Florida Supreme
Court, in Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Smith, 5 discharged a writ of certiorari
to the Third District Court of Appeal. The third district has held that the
right of an injured employee to maintain a common law action for breach
of employment contract, where the contract arose out of a collective
bargaining agreement, would not be defeated by his failure to first ex-
haust such administrative remedies as may have been available under
other federal labor statutes.'
While involved in a "field test," the employee in question fell in
exhaustion and so injured himself that he was not able to return to work.
12. Supra note 3. (Emphasis added.)
13. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1965),
which confers jurisdiction upon federal district courts in suits for violation of collective
bargaining contracts does not "divest" state courts of jurisdiction either at law or equity.
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). However, state courts must apply
federal labor law in exercising "concurrent" jurisdiction with federal courts over suits for
violation of collective bargaining contracts, Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
14. Scott v. National Airlines, Inc., 150 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1963). In the Scott case, the
Supreme Court was faced with a suit for wrongful discharge alter the employee had exer-
cised his "right" of filing a grievance under the contract and had lost. But see Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
15. 162 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1964).
16. Smith v. Florida E. Coast Ry., I1 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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The employee first brought a negligence action under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act,'" alleging inter alia, that he was negligently and
unlawfully required to take the field test. The cause of action was ulti-
mately dismissed on appeal,' with the court indicating that were the
employee aggrieved, his remedy for such grievance lay under the Railway
Labor Act.'9
Thereafter, the employee brought suit for breach of the employment
contract which had arisen out of the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. The trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that the principle of res judicata operated to bar the employee's
action, and that jurisdiction of the cause was vested solely in the National
Railway Adjustment Board under the terms of the Railway Labor Act.
The district court, in reversing the circuit court, commented:
Instead of pursuing such administrative remedies as might have
been available to him under the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and the Railway Labor Act, Title 45, U.S.C.A.
§ 151, et seq., the appellant elected to bring a common law
action in the state court for breach of contract, a remedy differ-
ent from any which the National Railway Adjustment Board
has the power to provide, and one which does not involve ques-
tions of future relations between the railroad and its other
employees. This was his prerogative."
In another action involving the Florida East Coast Railway Com-
pany, two employees sought to convert an alleged breach of contract
into a tort action by alleging malice." The plaintiffs instituted an action
in the Circuit Court of Dade County seeking damages for what they
alleged to be a malicious conspiracy by the railroad and its director of
personnel to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights under an agreement
between the company and a labor organization. The trial judge initially
denied a motion by the railroad to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action; however, he thereafter granted defendant's
motion for a summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that no cause of
action had been stated by the complaint, and therefore did not reach
the question of summary judgment. Concerning the alleged "tort," the
court commented:
If the defendant, railroad, breached its contract to employ the
17. 4. U.S.CA. § 51 (1965).
18. Butler v. Smith, 104 So.2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
19. 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1965).
20. This holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Florida E. Coast
Ry., supra note 16, at 73 is in keeping with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
21. Days v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 165 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
1965]
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plaintiffs, this breach of contract may not be converted into a
tort by an allegation that it was maliciously done.2
2. APPLICABILITY OF "FOREIGN" LABOR LAWS
The Venezuelan Labor Code was held to be applicable to determine
the right of a Florida-based employee of a Venezuelan corporation to
certain benefits upon termination of employment. In Rutas Aereas
Nacionales, S.A. v. Robinson,23 Robinson, a United States citizen and
resident of Miami, Florida, had been employed as a pilot for the de-
fendant, a Venezuelan Airline, RANSA. In July of 1960, a receiver was
appointed to control RANSA's Florida property and practically all of the
Miami-based personnel were released. Robinson, one of five Miami-based
American pilots, intervened in the district court action, seeking various
terminal benefits provided for under the Venezuelan Labor Code. The
airlines defended on the contention that Florida and federal public policy
disfavors the enforcement of foreign labor laws; that, under the standard
conflict of laws rules prevailing in Florida, the place of making and place
of performance of Robinson's employment contract would require the
application of Florida labor law.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in finding for the plaintiffs,
reviewed Florida conflict of law rules relating to benefits accruing under
foreign employment contracts and determined that under the Florida
conflict rule, the Venezuelan Labor Code would apply.
B. Deference of State Courts to the Exercise and Use of the
Arbitration Procedure of a Collective Bargaining Contract
In Jacksonville Roofing Ass'n v. Local 365, Sheet Metal Workers
24
the First District Court of Appeal affirmed a decision of a circuit court
judge who exercised his discretion by declining jurisdiction in an action
brought for a declaratory decree involving the intepretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement. The chancellor gave the following as
his reason for declining jurisdiction and rendering a declaratory decree:
This court could properly assume jurisdiction in this case, but,
under those circumstances, conceives that it should exercise its
judicial discretion to leave the contending parties to the proce-
dure they agreed upon for the interpretation of their contract,
unless that procedure is not expeditiously pursued. 5
In affirming the decision, the district court commented:
In our opinion, not only has no abuse of discretion been demon-
22. Id. at 436.
23. 339 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1964).
24. 156 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
25. Id. at 418.
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strated in this appeal, but we think that the chancellor in his
order exercised a very sound judicial discretion in ruling as
he did."6
In an action for recovery of certain vacation benefits, the Small
Claims Court of Dade County27 deferred to the arbitration procedure of
a collective bargaining contract in entering a judgment for the defendant.
The action was one brought by an employee against his former employer
for vacation pay allegedly due under a collective bargaining contract.
The court reviewed the claim on its merits and decided that the employee
was not entitled to any vacation under the existing agreement. He also
found, however, that an arbitration procedure was available to all em-
ployees who had a grievance, but inasmuch as the plaintiff had not
pursued this procedure, the action should be dismissed. The judge com-
mented:
*.. there was an obligation and a binding contract between the
employee and the company, and that before a suit may be filed
the employee must exhaust certain procedures. These rules are
there because if they were not, five thousand people could all
walk out on the job and file five thousand different law suits. He
was a union member, and was bound by the terms and condi-
tions of the contract.28
C. Breach of a No-Strike Provision of a Collective Bargaining Contract
Florida courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit by an employer
to enforce no-strike and no-picketing clauses of a collective bargaining
agreement.2 9 Following the Dowd and Lucas Flour cases,"° injunctive
relief was sought in federal court for breach or violation of no-strike and
no-picketing clauses of collective bargaining agreements. However, in
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,"x the United States Supreme Court held
that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of a
26. Id. at 419. Although the basic issue involved in the Jacksonville Roofing Ass'n case
is the use of discretion by a Circuit Court judge in an action for declaratory decree [under
FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1965); North Shore Bank v. Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954)], the
decision of the Florida courts to defer to a grievance-arbitration procedure when the issue
was the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement fully accords with the
majority view as expressed by the Supreme Court in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50,
Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). In the Drake case, an employer brought a damage
action in the federal court for breach of a no-strike provision, under § 301 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Upon the filing of the suit the union filed for arbitration under the
existing contract. The Supreme Court held that the action for damage should be stayed,
pending arbitration of the damage claim under the existing arbitration clause.
27. Warford v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 22 Fla. Supp. 50 (Small Cl. Ct. 1963).
28. Id. at 53.
29. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Local 780, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
AFL-CIO, 160 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
30. Supra note 13.
31. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement because of the pro-
hibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
32
In a Florida case, the employer, Radio Corporation of America,
brought an action in the state court to enforce a no-strike, no-picketing
provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the chancellor
issued a temporary restraining order; however, pursuant to a motion by
the defendant-union, the circuit court dissolved the order. The matter
came before the Second District Court of Appeal on an interlocutory
appeal from the order of dissolution. The issue was whether or not the
state court had authority to grant an injunction against the violation
of a no-strike, no-picketing provision of a collective bargaining contract.
In reversing and remanding, the second district aligned Florida with
New York and California 33 which allow their state courts to enjoin
violations or breaches of no-strike provisions of collective bargaining
agreements.
Commenting on the union's contention that jurisdiction in labor
matters of this type had been pre-empted by the federal law, the court
said:
Insofar as Florida is concerned, there is no indication, either by
statute or through any decisions of our Supreme Court which
curtails jurisdictional powers of the state court to enjoin a
proceeding such as this; nor, as to the subject matter here
involved, does any act of Congress which may be restrictive as
to federal court jurisdiction, express such a limitation upon
jurisdiction of the state court. Absent a congressional or state
enactment or a judicial pronouncement by the United States
Supreme Court, or the Florida Supreme Court to the contrary,
jurisdiction of the state court is not divested. From our study
and research, the precise question presented before this court
has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United
States. We do not find as persuasive the particular decisions
of that tribunal urged by the appellees. Rather, of the United
States Supreme Court cases which we have cited along with
decisions emanating from various states, leave us persuaded
that jurisdiction of Florida courts under circumstances such as
these is not pre-empted.34
III. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS, AGENTS AND MEMBERS
Ordinarily, courts will not interfere to settle differences between a
labor union or other voluntary association and its members.3 5 However,
32. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1965).
33. Perry v. Robilotto, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963); A. I. Gage Plumbing Supply
Co., Inc. v. Local 300, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 202 Cal. App. 2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 860
(Dist. Ct. 1962).
34. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Local 780, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
AFL-CIO, 160 So.2d 150, 159 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
35. Taite v. Bradley, Fla., 151 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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in two minor decisions during the past two years, the courts of the state
indicated that labor organizations as such, and their officers and agents,
were far from "immune" from the legal processes of the state.
Both cases arose in the Palm Beach area. The first, an American
Federation of Musicians Case,8" involved an attempted use of an injunc-
tion by a labor organization to restrain the city of West Palm Beach
from levying and collecting an occupational license tax against the union.
The union sought the injunction on the theory that the ordinance con-
flicted with both the Federal Labor Management Relations Act and
the union's constitutional right of freedom of speech and assembly. The
Second District Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the lower
court, found the labor organization in question to be essentially a business
organization and subject to the license tax. The court quoted from the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. State:
Labor unions, like other trade, professional and business orga-
nizations are concerned with the business of making a living.
They do not bother themselves with the things that concern
religious bodies, chambers of commerce and like institutions."7
In the second case, Town of Palm Beach v. Loew,88 the Municipal
Court of Palm Beach found a labor union representative guilty on a
charge of disturbing the peace. The labor union representative was ar-
rested while standing outside a restaurant in Palm Beach, talking with
its operators in an effort to secure a labor contract. Witnesses variously
described the conduct of the labor union representative as "boisterous,"
typified by "wild gesturing of the arms," a "very loud, angry tone" and
a "very belligerent manner," that he employed language such as, "don't
think that any scabs are going to enter this place. They are going to
get their heads broken in if they do." The incident attracted the attention
of passers-by and patrons of the restaurant, and, as stated by one of the
witnesses, "caused the crowd to stop and gather." The labor union rep-
resentative, in his testimony, denied being guilty of conduct tending to
disturb the peace. The Circuit Court, 'Palm Beach County, Criminal
Appeal, affirmed the decision of the lower court which had found the
labor union representative guilty on a charge of disturbing the peace.
In commenting on the trial court's observation that the same behavior
might be offensive in some places and not in others, the Judge said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that Palm Beach is a unique
and exclusive resort frequented by many persons of wealth
and fame. Conduct which would hardly raise an eyebrow in a
slum area might well be considered a breach of the peace in
36. American Fed'n of Musicians, Local 806 v. City of West Palm Beach, 179 So.2d
134 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
37. 155 Fla. 245, 253, 19 So.2d 857, 860 (1944) rev'd on other grounds in Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945).
38. 21 Fla. Supp. 145 (Cir. Ct. 1963).
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such a community. In the light of these facts, this court fails
to find error in the judgment of the trial court.89
IV. BOYCOTTS, STRIKES AND PICKETING
Federal pre-emption in the field of labor management relations can
hardly be questioned.4 ° The general principle which has evolved is that
states must yield to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Re-
lations Act when the activity complained of is "arguably" within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
This general principle was recently affirmed by the Second District
Court of Appeal in Local 675, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Meekins,
Inc.41 In Meekins, the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed a deci-
sion of the lower court which had enjoined certain picketing of the em-
ployer by the labor organization in question. After discussing, at length,
the general principle of federal pre-emption and its effect of barring
states from enjoining peaceful picketing that "affects" interstate com-
merce, the court discussed the question of whether or not the employer,
Meekins, Inc., was an enterprise that met the jurisdictional standards of
the National Labor Relations Board.42 The parties originally stipulated
that the employer had purchased, during the last year, more than $50,000
worth of goods that originated outside the state of Florida. The appellant-
union conceded that the record did not show conclusively that the ap-
pellee's purchases were directly from outside of Florida or from sellers,
within the state, who themselves received the goods directly from outside
of the state. However, it argued that the totality of the evidence presented
clearly indicated that Meekins was involved in commerce within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The court agreed with
the appellant that there was every indication that Meekins was engaged
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Re-
39. Id. at 146.
40. For extended discussion of "pre-emption" question, see previous survey article, supra
note 1.
41. 175 So.2d 59 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 179 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1965).
42. § 164(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. (1965) vests in the National Labor Relations Board dis-
cretionary authority to decline to assert jurisdiction over "any labor dispute involving any
class or category of employers where in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor
dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction."
Pursuant to this authority, the Board has adopted certain jurisdictional yardsticks to guide
it in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In non-retail businesses, jurisdiction will be asserted
if the yearly outflow or inflow across state lines, whether "direct" or "indirect," is $50,000.
Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 NLRB 81, 85 (1958). In the Siemons case, the Board stated:
. . . For the purposes of applying this standard, direct outflow refers to goods
shipped or services furnished by the employer outside the state. Indirect outflow
refers to sales of goods or services to users meeting any of the Board's jurisdictional
standards except the indirect outflow or indirect inflow standard. Direct inflow
refers to goods or services furnished directly to the employer from outside the state
in which the employer is located. Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods
or services which originated outside the employer's state, but which he purchased




lations Act, but asserted that since the record itself was inadequate for
such a determination on their part, the lower court's enjoining of the
picketing must be upheld. In addition to the stipulation, the court had
before it: (1) a complaint filed by Meekins in 1962 which alleged an
annual purchase of goods outside of Florida in excess of $50,000, and
(2) evidence of purchases made by general contractors at the construc-
tion site in question of materials allegedly not manufactured in Florida,
totalling $100,000. The court commented, with respect to the 1962 com-
plaint, that such complaint obviously failed to establish the nature of
Meekins' business activities in the year immediately preceding the insti-
tution of the action in question, and that the evidence, with regard to
the purchases of the general contractors, failed to show that the in-state
suppliers did, in effect, receive the goods from outside of the state.
In an earlier case, Local 675, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Acme Concrete Corp.,4" the Third District Court of Appeal, in reversing
and remanding a case to the Circuit Court for Dade County, held that
where it was stipulated that employer's business "affected" interstate
commerce, the only question was whether the picketing by the local
union was "arguably" within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, and therefore, the state court lacked jurisdiction. Citing the
holding in Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union v. Babcock Co.," the
Third District Court held that the activities of the labor organizations
complained of were such that they were arguably within the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act, and consequently the jurisdiction
of the state court had been pre-empted to the extent that the exclusive
jurisdiction to consider and determine such matter was with the National
Labor Relations Board.
In analyzing the two decisions, the conclusion to be drawn is that
although the question of pre-emption 4' and the question of whether the
subject matter is a labor dispute46 appears to be fairly well-settled, the
issue of jurisdiction in state court injunction proceedings47 is far from
resolved.48
43. 168 So.2d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
44. 132 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
45. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
46. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964).
47. Injunction being an equitable relief, the Florida Constitution confers exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction on the circuit courts, FLA. CONST., art. V, § 11.
48. For a further discussion of this issue of jurisdiction by a district court of appeals,
see International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 349 v. White, 143 So.2d 348 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1962), where the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida was faced with an issue in-
volving jurisdiction in a suit to enjoin peaceful picketing, in which the complaint alleged
that the employer was not engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning 'of the
National Labor Relations Act. The union filed a motion to quash and dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Union claimed that the chancellor should have investigated, on
the basis of its motion to quash and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the issue of interstate
commerce, to determine if the subject matter of the litigation was pre-empted by the
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V. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The only significant legislative developments in the labor relations
field during the survey period are related to redefining "labor organiza-
tions" and to the registration requirements placed upon their representa-
tives. The existing definition of a labor organization was amended so as
to add the phrase "and recognized by one or more employers as a unit
of bargaining." '49 The business agents, licenses, permits, etc., section of
the Florida Statutes was amended to require the submission of a full set
of fingerprints by each business agent seeking to be licensed under the
statutes."° The section was further amended to provide for an annual
renewal of license granted business agents on July 1, 1965."' Section
447.09 of the Florida Statutes (concerning the right of franchise of any
member of a labor organization) was amended to add two new sub-
sections. One provides a penalty for soliciting advertising in the name of
a labor organization without the authority of the organization. 2 The
other provides a penalty for advertising through any medium as repre-
senting a labor organization without such authority in writing from the
organization."
National Labor Relations Board. The third district held that where the record fails to
affirmatively show that the business in which the employer was engaged affects interstate
commerce, then it is "premature" to apply the doctrine of pre-emption.
49. FLA. STAT. § 447.02(1) (1965).
50. FLA. STAT. § 447.04(2) (1965).
51. FLA. STAT. § 447.16 (1965).
52. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(14) (1965).
53. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(15) (1965).
